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This work proposes to rely on the capital gains tax legislation to introduce transfers in
merger control. Transfers are never used in merger regulation, however they can represent
a relevant device to extract information on synergies. The implicit transfer collected thanks
to the capital gains tax, associated with divestitures, allows to screen among high and low
synergy achievers. The analysis focuses on the fact that the transfer is ￿scally constrained.
It must be strictly positive but lower than a threshold; the capital gains tax paid by target
shareholders depends on the ratio of cash used by the bidder as a medium of paiement in
the takeover bid and on the tax rate. The upper ￿scal constraint combined with a non
monotonic consumer surplus function allow the ine￿cient type to enjoy a rent, and a￿ect
the usual rent-e￿ciency trade-o￿. The lower ￿scal constraint induces the e￿cient type’s
divestitures to be distorted downward from the ￿rst best.
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11 Introduction
Economists interested in mergers all agree on one fact: mergers increase market
prices through an intensi￿cation of the market power if they are not backed up with
substantial e￿ciency gains.1 The lack of synergies has a negative impact on the
consumer surplus, since higher prices decrease the purchasing power. Nevertheless, if
anticompetitive e￿ects are dominant, the competition authority can use divestitures,
as a tool to restore e￿ective competition in relevant markets.
Divestitures a￿ect the allocation of propriety rights through partial or total sale
of the combined business to another market player. 2 For instance in the merger
between GDF and Suez in November 2006, the EC initially found that the deal
would have anticompetitive e￿ects in the gas and electricity wholesale in Belgium
and in France. However, the EC accepted the merger provided the divestiture of
Distrigaz and SPE. This, in response to the anticompetitive concerns and synergies
promised by concerned parties. In light of these divestitures, the EC concluded that
the merger would not signi￿cantly impede competition in the European economic
area or any substantial part of it, 3 and would not hurt consumers trough an increase
in prices.
This article proposes to rely on the ￿scal system concerning the capital gains tax
to o￿er to the antitrust agency another tool for its regulation task. This paper also
aims at emphasizing other regulatory methods, in order to take a fair competition
policy decision. The use of the capital gains tax as a transfer seems to be a relevant
way to create incentives in the merger procedure and to get over two basic di￿culties.
The ￿rst is the information problem. On the one hand, when ￿rms propose a
merger, they have a de￿nite idea of the gains that they will achieve and the e￿ect of
their merger on the price. On the other hand, the commission does not dispose of
all elements required to evaluate the exact level of synergy, and thus the knock-on
e￿ect on consumers.
1Among others Farrell and Shapiro (1990).
2For a discussion of remedies, see Monti (2002), Motta, Polo, Vasconcelos (2002), Rey (2003).
3See http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/mergers/cases/index.html, case COMP/M.4180.
2In this asymmetric information context, the antitrust agency should propose
a menu of contracts to learn information about synergies that merged ￿rms will
achieve. Unfortunately it is confronted with a second problem: the lack of regu-
latory tools. In competition policy, available tools are not as extended as those
employed by regulation authorities. The latter are indeed able to directly control
prices or produced quantities, and to specify an explicit amount of transfer. 4 Merger
commissions never use transfers in spite of the screening device that they represent.
Common wisdom in merger control argue that transfers cannot be used as a regu-
lation tool. However a ￿scal system exists in merger, since target shareholder are
taxed for the sell of their stocks. Why the antitrust agency could not rely on this
tax system to implement a transfer?
When a bidder ￿rm launches a tender o￿er over a target ￿rm, it proposes to buy
each target shareholder’s stocks at a ￿xed cash payment, which is generally over the
￿nancial markets prices. Each stockholder achieving capital gains on the sell of their
shares, is immediately taxed thanks to the capital gains tax. After the takeover bid
procedure, a tax authority collects this quanti￿able monetary amount which goes in
the State’s reserves.
A transfer can be used but it is constrained by the takeover bid legislation, in
France the tax rate is 27% , 20% in the US, 30% in Sweden and Belgium shareholders
are exempt. The special case where optimal transfers are not implementable can
occur here. A ￿scal constraint problem exists in our merger control model, it is
twofold. The transfer must be positive (the lower ￿scal constraint), but under the
transfer de￿ned by the costlier medium of paiement (the upper ￿scal constraint).
The medium of exchange in mergers can take several shapes: either all in cash,
either all in stock, or with a mix of the two media of paiement. We will focus on the
mix bid. The all stock procedure is a pure stock exchange and need no immediate
tax payment, it allows to avoid tax penalties. Consequently, the merger will generate
a transfer proportionate to the ratio of cash in the mix bid, because of the capital
gains tax the new entity must pay immediately.
To my knowledge, there are no published articles on taxation as a tool for merger
4See, for instance, Baron-Myerson (1982).
3control,5 it is the reason why this work constitutes a true contribution. It associates
di￿erent merger literature ￿elds. For the ￿nance aspect we rely on the paper devel-
oped by Eckbo et al.(1990) and more precisely on the idea of Brown et al.(1991).
They analyze the media of paiement’s e￿ects in mergers, and show that bidders
with unfavorable private information about their value, choose o￿ers containing
some stock to avoid the capital gains tax consequences of cash o￿ers. For the
remedies aspect we rely on papers developed by Medvedev (2004), who proposes a
Cournot analysis of mergers and remedies in complete information; and Cosnita and
Tropeano (2005), who build a contract in asymmetric information with divestitures
supposing that the commission can control the assets sale price. The reader could
also refer to Vasconcelos (2005) for an endogenous merger process with remedies, to
VergØ (2007), for an extension of Farrell and Shapiro (1990) in a divestitures con-
text, or to Besanko and Spulber(1993) for an analysis of policy making in mergers
and enforcement aspects of antitrust in an asymmetric information context.
When e￿ciency gains are the merged ￿rms private information, we are able to
deal with the design of optimal remedies and transfers. Those transfers will be
implicitly collected thanks to the capital gains tax. We assume, in a competition
game with homogenous good and constant marginal costs, a merger between two
￿rms creating either high or low synergies and requiring divestitures. For each type
of merger, the antitrust agency proposes a menu of contracts with divestitures and
transfers, allowing to screen among types. The prime objective of the antitrust
agency is to protect consumers from price increases. 6 One of our objectives is to
characterize the solutions of the principal agent model with multi ￿scal constraints
and to compare them with the solutions of the unconstrained problem.
We show that the use of a transfer in merger control leads the antitrust agency to
be less demanding in term of divestitures. The AA objective is not only to maximize
the consumer surplus, but also to check that insiders get a surplus in the merger
with divestitures, which could be collected thanks to the transfer. Decreasing the
required level of divestiture is a relevant way to increase the insiders surplus. The
5Poitevin(1998), deals with the transferability of tax losses in the corporate control by mergers.
6This hypothesis of a consumer standard is subject to discussions, see Neven and Roller (2005).
4non monotonic consumer surplus function combined with the upper ￿scal constraint
leads the agency to leave a rent to the ine￿cient type, 7 in addition to the information
rent left to e￿cient insiders. Those two properties will a￿ect the usual rent-e￿ciency
trade-o￿. When the problem of the antitrust agency is subject to the low ￿scal
constraint, then the e￿cient level of divestiture is distorted downward from the
￿rst-best. Finally, when both ￿scal constraints are binding, the public intervention
leads insiders to behave oppositely in term of the medium of paiement’s choice.
The paper proceeds as follows. After a description of the model in Section 2,
we show in Section 3, that a possible solution for the antitrust agency to counteract
information problem, is to build an incentive contract with an amount of divestitures
and any transfer, for each type of synergy. Unfortunately, a direct transfer is not
possible in the merger regulation procedure, therefore Section 4 deals with merger
control and transfers from the capital gains tax. Finally, Section 5 concludes.
2 The model
Initially, in the no merger state, we consider three symmetric ￿rms with the same
constant marginal costs: c, producing an homogenous product. Each ￿rm maximizes
its pro￿ts as a Cournot-Nash player. The solution of this program de￿nes individual
status quo value: ?, for ￿rms and CS
?, for consumers ( represents pro￿ts, and
CS the Consumer Surplus).
Without loss of generality, ￿rm 1 (the bidder), ￿nds an opportunity to improve
its costs in a merger with ￿rm 2 (the target). The merged entity, also called insiders
and indexed I, enjoys a positive multiplier of synergy gain , that could not be
obtained without a merger. Low values of  depict high synergy gains. The merger
creates costs asymmetries between ￿rms, modifying the new entity’s marginal cost
function: CmI() < c, with CmI
() > 0 (subscripts indicate partial derivatives).
Firm 3, also called the outsider and indexed O, keeps its marginal cost constant:
CmO = c. As a result: I
() < 0; and because of the duopoly competition:
7This rent is not due to information asymmetries.
5O
 () > 0. From the point of view of the Antitrust Agency (AA), the value of
the merger is summarized in the consumer surplus CS(). The more merged ￿rms
achieve synergies, the more they can pass on their cost savings through a fall in
the o￿ered price, and the more the consumer surplus can be improved. Formally:
CS() < 0. A standard graphical analysis,8 summarizes the above assumptions.
<Insert Figure 1>
In Figure 1 (see Appendix A), curves depict gains of the merger in surplus terms
depending on  for the three parties involved. From the insiders’ point of view, gains
to merge are increasing with the level of synergies they can achieve (decreasing in
). Below 3, synergies improve the insiders’ situation, but cannot be su￿cient to be
transformed in a price decrease (as in Farrell and Shapiro (1990)). It is the reason
why the level of synergy which improves the consumer surplus: 1, is on the left of
3. Below 1, costs savings are so large that insiders can pass on e￿ciency gains to
consumers, by decreasing prices. But the fall in price exacerbates competition in the
sector; below 1, the outsider is negatively a￿ected by the merger. Between 2 and
1, insiders gains are more and more important compared to those of the outsider.
If synergies are too low for the price to decrease; i.e. on the right of 1, the AA
can use divestitures , to correct the inconveniences generated by the merger and
to make prices the lower as possible. Divestitures improve the consumer surplus
up to : CS(;) > 0, moreover CS(;) < 0 (non monotonic assumption).
There is no entry possibility, assets divested are sold to the outsider.
After the divestiture procedure, ￿rms become more symmetric and prices are
brought down by the increase in competition. Divestitures reduce costs asymmetries
between ￿rms, they are costly for insiders: CmI
(;) > 0 and favorable for the
outsider: CmO
(;) < 0. Moreover, divestitures are more and more costly for
insiders, and are costlier for less e￿cient insiders. This leads to:
8See Duso et al.(2003).
6Assumption 1 :
I
(;) < 0 (1.1) ;
O
(;) > 0 (1.2) ;
I
(;) < 0 (1.3) ;
I
(;) < 0 (1.4) ;
When insiders accept to merge with divestitures, they get a pro￿t: I(;) from
production, and they receive a payment P from the outsider for divested assets.
P is endogenous, and depends on divestitures and on synergies. Let IS(;) 
I(;)+ P(;)   2?, be the insiders surplus to merge. Furthermore, they will
pay a costly positive transfer t.
We assume that insiders have all the bargaining power in the determination of
the assets sale price: they are able to propose a price P to the outsider, that binds
its participation constraint. For the outsider, P is exactly the gains from receiving
divestitures: P(;)  O(;)   O(0;). The assets’ price is all the larger that
insiders are more ine￿cient. Indeed, from assumption (1:4) and because of Cournot
competition: O
(;) > 0, implying P(;) > 0.
We can rewrite insiders surplus to merge as a function of the sector’s total pro￿t:
IS(;) = I(;) + O(;)   O(0;)   2?. We assume that the insiders







  (2.1) ;
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Assumption 2 is not unreasonable, even if it is restrictive. It guarantees the
Spence-Mirrlees condition, the concavity of the insiders’ surplus functions and allows
the maximization problem to have the good properties. Assumption 2 implies:
IS(;) < 0, IS(;) < 0 and IS(;) < 0. Furthermore the insiders
surplus is concave in divestitures: IS(;) < 0, and ￿nally: IS(;) < 0.9
9This assumption is necessary to ensure the convexity of the information rent.
73 Merger Control with unrestricted Transfers
In this benchmark Section, we look at the nature of the incentive problem when
transfers are not constrained. To screen between good and bad insiders, we assume
that the AA is allowed to order any arbitrary and explicit transfer associated with
an amount of divestiture. Initially, we deal with the optimal solutions in complete
information to derive the ￿rst best, then in asymmetric information over synergies.
We will index the ￿rst best by FB and the second best by SB. Later, we will consider
the case of the shutdown of the less e￿cient type. This principal agent analysis is
standard (La￿ont and Martimort (2002)). We will only announce some necessary
assumptions for the merger control case, and some results which follow.
3.1 First and second best contracts
During the merger in complete information, insiders achieve a level of synergy 
which is publicly observable. The AA’s objective is to ￿nd a contract (;t) which
maximizes the sum of the consumer surplus and the transfer, providing that insiders
accept the contract (subject to the participation constraint PC).
max
f;tg
CS(; ) + t
s.t. : (PC) : IS(;)   t  0
In a traditional way in the principal agent theory, the AA binds the insid-
ers’ participation constraint. The ￿rst best amount of divestitures are solution of:
CS(FB ; ) =  IS(FB ; )
First best divestitures are given by the above ￿rst order conditions, which balance
the ￿rst consumer surplus derivative in relation with divestitures and the negative
of the ￿rst insiders surplus derivative in relation with divestitures. By assumption
(2:1): IS(;) < 0 implying that CS(FB ; ) > 0. We know that in :
CS( ; ) = 0, so CS( ; ) < CS(FB ; ). Since CS(;) < 0, it is
always true that: FB < , the solution of the ￿rst best, in divestitures term, is
8on the left of the solution which maximizes the consumer surplus (see Figure 2 in
Appendix A).
When transfers are possible in merger control, the AA’s objective is not only to
maximize the consumer surplus, but also to check that insiders get a surplus in the
merger with divestitures, which could be collected thanks to t. Without t, the AA
will level out marginal costs in order to obtain the perfect symmetry in the sector.
To propose  guarantees the lowest price and the maximum output. 10 But the AA
can get away with decreasing  so as to provide a bigger surplus to insiders.
In asymmetric information, insiders can be either e￿cient (with probability )
when they generate high synergies; i.e.  = ; or ine￿cient (with probability (1  
)); i.e.  = , with     > 0. The sequence of events is standard. The AA
must ￿nd a contract for each type of insiders which maximizes the expected value
of the consumer surplus including the transfer that it can recover, subject to the
participation and the incentive constraints ( (PC) and (IC) for e￿cient insiders;





CS(; ) + t

+ (1   )





> > > > > <
> > > > > :
(PC) : IS(;)   t  0
(PC) : IS(;)   t  0
(IC) : IS(;)   t  IS(;)   t
(IC) : IS(;)   t  IS(;)   t
In the second best, the AA is ready to accept some distortions away from what it
could do in complete information, in order to decrease the information rent (hereafter
quoted R) intended to e￿cient insiders. Traditionally, the maximization of the AA’s
program calls for no distortion away from the ￿rst best for -type: 
FB = 
SB.
The AA’s maximization program for the ine￿cient type yields to:
(1   )[CS(
SB






9The second best solution in divestiture terms for the ine￿cient type occurs when
the expected marginal e￿ciency gains of the merger with divestitures and the ex-
pected marginal cost of the rent are equated. The above ￿rst order condition depicts
the trade-o￿ between the e￿ciency of divestitures intended to the ine￿cient type
and the cost of the information rent left to the e￿cient type. At the second best
equilibrium, the AA is neither willing to increase nor to decrease the ine￿cient
amount of divestiture.




. The -type has to
divest even less than the -type in the second best. We must not forget that the
AA can recover insiders surplus since it disposes of a transfer tool. In addition,
decreasing  is a relevant way to increase transfers devoted to ine￿cient insiders in
order to relax incentive constraint for e￿cient insiders.
Proposition 1 First best and second best optimal contracts in merger control with
unrestricted transfers are such that:


















FB and tFB > tSB
<Insert Figure 2>
From the insiders’ point of view, divestitures and transfers are costly. The iso-
surplus curves of both types correspond to increasing level of surplus when one moves
in the southwest direction. Iso-surplus curves are decreasing and concave in  and
t, they represent the set of (;t), which maintain insiders in a situation at least
as favorable as the no merger situation. From the AA’s point of view, divestitures
and transfers are bene￿cial since they improve the consumer surplus. The increase
in surplus goes in the northeast direction, iso-surplus functions are increasing and
convex in  and t. It is costless for an e￿cient to divest an asset (assumption 1(4)),
therefore iso-surplus curves for ine￿cient insiders are steeper. Those curves, for
di￿erent types cross only once, guaranteing the Spence-Mirrlees property.
The standard argument remains that both incentive constraints imply that the
optimal level of divestiture is such that e￿cient insiders divest more:  > .
10The AA will link divestitures and synergy. Two di￿erent level of synergies must
not divest the same amount . As insiders which enjoy higher level of synergies
increase even more the anticompetitive detrimental e￿ect, it looks natural that, view
to competition in a Cournot model, they must divest more, in order to restore the
higher cost asymmetry they have generated. Thus we have: () < 0.
Our results are in accordance with the traditional principal agent results de-
scribed in La￿ont and Martimort(2002). We are in a very standard case of revela-
tion of information. E￿cient insiders have to divest more than ine￿cient insiders
but receive an information rent, in the form of lower transfers. 11
3.2 Shutdown of the less e￿cient type
We extend our framework assuming that the AA is confronted to the possibility
that ine￿cient mergers were suboptimal even with any divestitures. For those level
of synergies, divestitures worsen the ine￿cient insiders situation, deteriorate the
competition even more and bene￿t the outsider. The merger associated with this
level of synergy and any divestitures will always depreciate the consumer surplus.
The AA must compute the value of: CS(;) = CS(;) + t   CS ?. When
this value is negative, a contract for the ine￿cient which could allow to improve the
consumer situation does not exist. This trade-o￿ de￿nes a threshold ^  above which
an ine￿cient type must not be allowed to merge, even with divestitures. Proposition
2 summarizes the main features of the optimal contract with shutdown.
Proposition 2 The optimal menu of contracts with shutdown entails:
 If  > ^ , then the AA o￿ers (
FB;tFB), only -type merges.
 If  < ^ , and  high, then the AA o￿ers (
FB;tFB), only -type merges.
 If  < ^ , and  low, then the AA proposes the second best contract [SB ; SB ],
every type merges and the AA leaves an information rent to -type.
11Note that the optimal contract could specify a negative transfer for insiders, which will lead
the AA to pay for the merger to be allowed. We will develop this aspect further.
11In the ￿rst case the level of synergy achieved by ine￿cient insiders is not enough
from the AA’s point of view. The best way to exclude the less e￿cient type from the
merger is to propose a unique contract to both type of insiders: (
FB;tFB). This
contract would never be chosen by an ine￿cient type, moreover it does not provide
rent to e￿cient insiders. In the second case, the ine￿cient merger is consumer
surplus enhancing in complete information, but the proportion of e￿cient is, a
priori, important in comparison with the proportion of ine￿cient. The AA must
often leave an information rent to the e￿cient type, whereas the probability to draw
an ine￿cient type is low. For incentives reasons, the AA proposes: (
FB;tFB)
to both type of insiders to exclude the ine￿cient type. The presence of the ￿rst
ine￿cient insider creates imitation incentives and the paiement of a socially costly
information rent. In the last case the proportion of ine￿cient is a priori important.
The AA must leave an information rent to e￿cient insiders in very few cases and





4 Merger control with transfers from the capital
gains tax
The bidder ￿rm proposes to target shareholders a mixed bid composed of a ratio
of cash p, and a ratio of stock (1   p). The ratio p implicitly de￿nes an amount of
capital gains that shareholders are going to achieve and hence a monetary transfer
t that insiders must pay as taxes. The mixed bid is all the more ￿scally costly that
p is important. Indeed, when p is high, the bidder ￿rm proposes a more important
part of cash for target shares. This increases the amount of capital gains and leads
insiders to pay more in capital gains tax term: thus t is high.
It is worth noticing that the use of this transfer tool is constrained. The AA
cannot modify neither the tax rate, nor the premium by share proposed by the
bidder. Moreover, for a given tax rate, the minimum transfer that the AA is able
to capture is de￿ned by an o￿er without cash, since it allows to avoid tax penalties:
tmin = 0 when p = 0. The maximum transfer, is de￿ned by the costlier procedure
12all in cash, that generates the higher tax revenue: tmax, such that p = 1. Transfers
must be between 0 and tmax. There is no more important tax than the one de￿ned
by the all cash bid, except for higher premium by share. In spite of those limits, the
AA is able to include this constrained ￿scal parameter into its objective function,
since it can consider that the monetary amount can be reallocated to consumers.
Be that as it may, it is a tax that consumers will not have to pay.
The use of transfer from the capital gains tax for merger control will modify
the ex ante ￿nancial markets anticipations about the shares value of the merged
entity. Nevertheless, we neglect all the impact of this regulation policy on ￿nancial
markets, keeping in mind that this transfer tool will indisputably have a ￿nancial
market e￿ect.
The timing of events is the following. First insiders learn if they are -type or -
type. Then, the AA proposes a menu of contracts to insiders. Each contract speci￿es
a transfer t that insiders must pay and a level of divestiture , as structural remedies.
Insiders choose a unique contract among those proposed, in announcing the ratio
p in the mixed takeover bid. This will imply a capital gains tax of an amount t,
computed by the AA. Lastly insiders receive P(;) for the sell of divestitures to
the outsider. Insiders can retain their status quo value by giving up the merger.
The addition of transfers from the capital gains tax modi￿es substantially the
results from the previous unconstrained problem, but are qualitatively similar to
the results of limited liability with ex-ante contracting. 12 Of course in the present
model, we have two bounds on t rather than one. The ￿scal constrained solutions
are indexed FC.
4.1 The complete information context
The AA’s problem in complete information is to ￿nd a contract (;t) that maximizes
the sum of the consumer surplus and the transfer provided that insiders accept the
contract, and that the transfer is within both bounds ( (FCsup) and (FCinf)):13
12see La￿ont-Martimort(2002).
13Note that we could have a weight on t to illustrate the opportunity cost of public funds in
order to extend the model. This additional parameter will allow to have a discussion about the
13max
f;tg





(PC) : IS(;)   t  0
(FCsup) : t  tmax
(FCinf) : t  0
Proposition 3 The optimal menu of contracts in complete information entails:
 If 0 < IS(FB;) < tmax, then the AA proposes (FB;tFB);
 If IS(FB;)  0, then the AA proposes (FC
inf;0).
With FC
inf such that IS(FC
inf;) = 0;
 If IS(FB;)  tmax and IS(;) < tmax, then the AA proposes (FC
sup;tmax).
With FC
sup such that IS(FC
sup;) = tmax;
 If IS(FB;) > tmax and IS(;)  tmax, then the AA proposes (;tmax).
Proof: (See Appendix B).
<Insert Figure 3>
In complete information when the transfer is not ￿scally constrained, like in
Section 3, the insiders’ participation constraint (PC) is always binding. If it wasn’t,
the AA could increase t for the same , since its objective function is increasing in
t. Whereas here, the AA cannot increase t as it would want, because of the upper
￿scal constraint (FCsup). Thus the insiders’ participation constraint is not always
binding. Figure 3 (see Appendix A) depicts the solution of the ￿scally constrained
problem in complete information, for di￿erent levels of tmax.
For a threshold tmax
1 > IS(FB
1 ;), the ￿rst best solution is implementable. The
(FCsup) does not play any role, the ￿rst best transfer is tFB = IS(FB
1 ;) < tmax.
The optimal contract is FB1 in Figure 3.
redistributive e￿ciency of this particular transfer to consumers.
14If the ￿rst best contract speci￿es a negative amount of transfer: IS(FB
2 ;) < 0,
the AA must distort the level of divestiture downward, from FB
2 to FC
inf, in order
to increase the transfer to zero. Insiders propose a medium of paiement all in stock
and avoid tax penalties, whereas it would be optimal that the AA pays for the
merger with divestiture, for it to be allowed. To compensate, the AA decreases the
required amount of divestitures to FC
inf. The optimal contract is FC1 in Figure 3.
For a threshold tmax
2 2]IS(;);IS(FB
1 ;)[, the optimal level of divestiture
calls for an upward distortion away from the ￿rst best FB
1 , since the ￿rst best
transfer is over tmax. Insiders propose a medium of paiement all in cash for the
merger and pay a capital gains tax corresponding to tmax
2 . Note that if the AA
had disposed of any unconstrained transfer, it would have been optimal to make
insiders pay more than tmax
2 . To compensate, the AA increases the required amount
of divestiture to FC
sup. The optimal contract is FC2 in Figure 3.
For a threshold tmax
3  IS(;), it is in the AA’s interest to propose .
Keeping in mind that  is the level of divestiture which maximizes the consumer
surplus, thus proposing a higher level of divestiture for a given transfer tmax
3 will
never be optimal. Moreover, for any tmax  IS(;), the optimal divestiture
solution is always . The optimal contract is FC3 in Figure 3.
This particular case seems to be interesting both for merger control concerns
and for contract theory. It results from the confrontation of two properties in the
model. Firstly, the upper ￿scal constraint tmax does not allow the AA to implement
the level of transfer that it would want. Secondly, the consumer surplus is a non
monotonic function, since it exists a  which maximizes CS. Together, those
two properties lead the insiders participation constraint to be not always binding,
especially when tmax  IS(;). From the contract theory point of view it is an
original result, because insiders enjoy a rent even in complete information. As well
from the competition point of view, because the AA proposes the level  which
restores the perfect symmetry between insiders and the outsider’s marginal costs on
top of being consumer surplus maximizing.
In those particular cases, the optimal level of divestiture is no longer represented
by the tangency between the participation constraint and the AA surplus curve as
15in the ￿rst best. In complete information with ￿scal constraints we observe distor-
tions in comparison with the solution of complete information with any unrestricted
transfers. The ￿scal constraints modify the result of the previous Section, it is even
more the case as far as asymmetric information is concerned.
4.2 The asymmetric information context
Here the set of incentive-feasible contracts is constrained by some exogenous limits
on the feasible transfers between the AA and insiders. Those ￿scal constraints will
a￿ect the usual rent-e￿ciency trade-o￿.
When the AA faces a lack of information over the type of insiders in the con-
strained problem, it tries to ￿nd an appropriate contract for each type. This contract
must maximize the expected value of the consumer surplus plus the transfer that it
can recover, provided that insiders are at least in the same situation as before the
merger (participation constraints (PC) and (PC)), and that they choose the con-
tract intended for them (incentive constraints ( IC) and (IC)). Furthermore the AA
must choose transfers between 0 and tmax for each type (￿scal constraints: (FCsup),






CS(; ) + t

+ (1   )





> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > <
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > :
(PC) : IS(;)   t  0
(PC) : IS(;)   t  0
(IC) : IS(;)   t  IS(;)   t
(IC) : IS(;)   t  IS(;)   t
(FC sup) : t  tmax
(FC sup) : t  tmax
(FC inf) : t  0
(FC inf) : t  0
16Let us consider contracts with neither shutdown nor bunching; i.e, every type
merges and divests. Moreover, contracts are di￿erent from the e￿cient to the inef-
￿cient type. The resolution of this program allows the AA to extract information
about hidden e￿ciency gains, in proposing an appropriate contract.
As usual in incentive and contract theory, the main di￿culty to solve this kind
of maximization program, is to work out which of those constraints are relevant and
those which are not. We must ￿nd which constraints are binding at the optimum of
the AA’s problem.
First, (PC) is never binding (except for the shutdown case). Traditionally, the
ability of the e￿cient type to mimic the ine￿cient type implies that (PC) is always
strictly satis￿ed. Indeed, both (PC) and (IC) imply (PC). Second, as we showed
in the benchmark case () < 0, implying that t < t is always true in asymmetric
information, due to incentive constraints (IC) and (IC). This assertion means
that t is never equal to tmax, and that t is never equal to zero. In term of the
constraints, (FC sup) and (FC inf) are always strictly satis￿ed. Third, as (FC sup)
is never binding, then (IC) is binding, since the AA can always increase t so as to
bind (IC). Last, (IC) seems irrelevant because the incentive problem comes from
an e￿cient willing to pass itself for an ine￿cient rather than the opposite. We
will neglect (IC) and we will verify ex post that it is true. Thus we can neglect,
(PC), (FC sup), (FC inf) and (IC). Further, (IC) is always satis￿ed with strict
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> > > > > <
> > > > > :
(PC) : IS(;)   t  0
(IC) : IS(;)   t = IS(;)   t
(FC sup) : t  tmax
(FC inf) : t  0
17Given this maximization program, Proposition 4 and 5 summarize the main
features of the optimal contract when respectively (FC inf) is not binding and when
it is binding.
Proposition 4 The optimal menu of contracts in imperfect information with ￿scal
constraints when (FC inf) is not binding entails:
 If IS(
SB







;)  tmax and IS(
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;) > tmax and IS(
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Proof: (See Appendix B).
<Insert Figure 4 and Figure 5>
The results of Proposition 4 are very similar to the results of limited liability
on transfers with ex-ante contracting described in La￿ont and Martimort (2002). 14
There is no distortion at the top: e￿cient insiders divest e￿ciently; and an upward
distortion at the bottom: the ine￿cient type’s divestiture is distorted upward from
the ￿rst best. Figure 4 and 5 (see Appendix A) illustrate this result.
The results are similar but di￿erent in a way, since the ine￿cient type enjoy a
rent when IS(

;) > tmax. To deal with a rent for the ine￿cient type is original
per se. In fact, following the classical contract theory, a rent is usually paid by the
principal to the good type for incentive reasons, but the bad type is never rewarded,
14Of course, we are not in an ex-ante contracting framework, since insiders choose their contract
when they learn their type.
18because he is not subject to imitation behaviors. The rent paid to the ine￿cient
type comes from several properties of the model.
When IS(

;) > tmax, the level of divestiture 
FC
sup which binds both (PC)
and (FC sup) is over 

. For a given transfer tmax, the divestiture 
FC
sup cannot
be optimal, the AA will always prefer the divestiture 

rather than any higher
divestiture, when she takes the consumer surplus into account. It is the ￿rst point,
(PC) is not binding. However, 

cannot be optimal because the AA must leave
a rent to the ine￿cient type which could be decreased by an increase of  toward

FC
sup. Furthermore, an increase in  relax the e￿cient incentive constraint, when
the ine￿cient participation constraint is not binding. The optimal solution 
FC
1 , in
Figure 5, is the result of the trade-o￿ between a divestiture solution close to 

, for
consumer surplus reasons, and a divestiture solution close to 
FC
sup for rent extraction
reasons. Finally, the AA pays an information rent to the e￿cient type, and a rent to
the ine￿cient type. This rent is not due to information asymmetries but rather to
the constraint on transfers. Interestingly this divestiture will generate competition
issues. The outsider will bene￿t from the situation since the required divestiture
is over the divestiture of perfect symmetry. Then, with probability (1   ), the
outsider will enjoy a lower marginal cost in comparison with insiders.
Moreover, as far as the maximum transfer decreases exogenously, we observe
that the level of transfer intended for the e￿cient type decreases. E￿cient insiders
incorporate less cash and more stocks when tmax decreases. In a way, the regulation
power of the AA decreases, since the range of transfers available is shortened and
because contracts must remain incentive compatible: the upper ￿scal constraint
implies higher power incentives for insiders, the AA must pay higher rents as tmax
decreases.
In conclusion, when transfers are positive, the bigger the decrease in the set of
implementable transfers, the stronger the pressure on ine￿cient insiders to divest,
the higher the information rent enjoyed by e￿cient insiders, and hence the lower
the need to incorporate cash in their mix bid. In an another way, when the low
￿scal constraint does not matter, the AA must increase divestitures intended to the
ine￿cient type to keep e￿cient divestitures at the ￿rst best level.
19Proposition 5 The optimal menu of contracts in imperfect information with ￿scal
constraints when (FC inf) is binding entails:
 If IS(
SB
;) < tmax and t
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Proof: (See Appendix B).
<Insert Figure 6, Figure 7 and Figure 8>
The results of Proposition 5 are original and innovative both for merger control
and for contract theory. To the best of my knowledge, there are no works dealing
with principal agent models with two simultaneous bounds on transfers. Merger
control with transfers from the capital gains tax seems to be a good framework to
introduce this interesting approach into the contract theory.
Proposition 5 describes the optimal solutions when the second best transfer is
negative for the e￿cient type; i.e, when (FC inf) is binding. Figure 6,7 and 8 (see
Appendix A) illustrate the results of Proposition 5. (FC inf) binding amounts to
saying that the AA will be agree, for di￿erent reasons, to pay for the merger. This
merger could create a so much important decrease in price that it would justify
a monetary transfer from the AA toward those so e￿cient insiders. In the con-
text of transfer from the capital gains tax, such a negative transfer is not possible.
The smallest transfer is represented, in the takeover bid, by a medium of paiement
without any cash. The all stock bid is the costless bid since it allows to avoid tax
penalties, and de￿nes a transfer equal to zero. The nature of contracts is a￿ected
by this lower ￿scal constraint and brings new insights to the principal agent model.
20First, there is downward distortion at the top. Whatever the level of tmax, the
level of divestiture intended to e￿cient insiders is distorted downward from the ￿rst
best. It is yet an interesting result for contract theory, since we always deal with no
distortion at the top, even in Proposition 4. This is the main result of Proposition 5,
for any given tmax, e￿cient insiders use only stocks as medium of paiement, pay no
transfer to the AA, and divest less than their ￿rst best. This is due to the e￿cient
insiders capacity to achieve high synergy gains so as to pull down price under the
level expected by the AA. E￿cient insiders are rewarded in the form of no transfer
and lower divestitures. However, e￿cient insiders are not always the winners.
In particular if the upper ￿scal constraint is not binding. 15 Then the AA disposes
to a higher room for maneuver to increase the transfer intended to the ine￿cient
type, and can decrease ine￿cient divestitures to relax the e￿cient incentive con-
straint in comparison to the second best situation. Thus, the AA pays a lower
information rent to the e￿cient type. Importantly, in that context, we obtain the
opposite of the classical limited liability results; i.e there are downward distortion
at the bottom and at the top. The lower constraint, alone, pull optimal divestitures
down for both type of insiders.
As in the previous Proposition, the decrease of tmax down to IS(
SB
;) in-
creases the information rent paid to e￿cient insiders. Further, when tmax falls under
IS(

;) the AA must pay a rent to ine￿cient insiders. Figure 7 and 8 summarize
those points. Here, e￿cient insiders must propose only stock in their takeover bid,
whereas ine￿cient insiders propose only cash. In that case the level of divestiture
for the ine￿cient type is distorted upward from the second best, while the level of
divestiture for the e￿cient type is distorted downward from the ￿rst best (or from
the second best since 
FB = 
FB). In this context it is interesting to note that,
the public intervention leads insiders to behave oppositely to what they would do
without the public intervention. Indeed, according to economists interested in media
of paiement in mergers16, ine￿cient insiders choose o￿ers containing some stock to
avoid the capital gains tax consequences of cash o￿ers, and e￿cient insiders signal
15Figure 6 illustrates this result.
16Among others Eckbo et al.(1990) and Brown et al.(1991).
21their e￿ciency by choosing high cash levels.
Note that the corner solutions case can arise, when (FC sup) is not binding. In
this particular kind of principal agent model applied to merger control, the corner
solution amounts to saying that the ine￿cient type is allowed to merge without
divesting nothing. On the other hand, he must pay the higher transfer compatible
with its participation constraint. The concept of corner solutions in this model is
totally di￿erent to the corner solutions of La￿ont and Martimort (2002). In fact,
it corresponds to shutdown, since the ine￿cient type does not produce. Here the
ine￿cient type is not excluded from the deal, and can merge without compensation
except the one of paying capital gains tax. The AA can also propose the shutdown
of the less e￿cient type contract as in the unconstrained problem.
5 Conclusion:
Merger regulation is a crucial issue in international politics, and is prey to informa-
tion problems. The model presented here proposes to rely on the capital gains tax
legislation and on structural remedies to build incentive contracts in a merger control
framework. That is new in the merger control literature. This method seems to be a
relevant way to create incentive in merger control and to screen among "good" and
"bad" mergers. Thanks to a multi-constrained principal agent model, insiders are
induce to reveal their e￿ciency gains in the merger, and the AA is able to learn this
hidden parameter. We manage to ￿nd a fairly realistic and implementable transfer
tool. The drawback, for merger control, is that it is constrained on the top and on
the bottom, on the other hand, it generates interesting and innovative results for
the classical contract theory. Generally, the model speaks in favor of a less massive
utilization of divestitures in comparison with the practice, because of the transfer
tool.
The analysis shows that, the use of the capital gains tax as transfer allows to
implement the ￿rst best level of divestiture for e￿cient insiders in most asymmet-
ric information cases. In particular when transfers are positive in the constrained
problem and provided that the AA pays an increasing information rent as far as the
22range of transfers decreases. Moreover, the AA must pay a rent to the ine￿cient
type when the range of transfer falls under a critical threshold. The analysis also
shows that the public intervention leads ine￿cient insiders to pay more than e￿cient
insiders in term of transfers. This implies that ine￿cient insiders must incorporate
more cash in their takeover bid. Finally, when the AA should "pay" e￿cient insiders
to merge; i.e, when their transfers are negative in the unconstrained problem, the
AA must decrease their requested level of divestiture in order to be in accordance
with the capital gains tax legislation.
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PC : IS(;)   t = 0
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27Figure 5. The (PC) is not binding and the (FCsup) is binding:
t
 0
PC PC IC FC


















































































Figure 8. The (PC) is not binding, (FCsup) and (FCinf) are binding:
t
 0
PC PC IC SB IC FC

































Consider ￿rst that (FCsup) is not binding, then (PC) is binding. The objective
function of the AA is increasing in t, if both (FCsup) and (PC) were not binding,
the AA could increase t for any . Thus (PC) is binding, when (FCsup) is not
binding. In that case, (FCinf) can be either binding or not.
 If (FCinf) is not binding, then the AA can implement the ￿rst best solution.
Fiscal constraints do not play any role. When 0 < IS(FB;) < tmax, the
optimal contract is (FB;tFB).
 If (FCinf) is binding, then the program of the AA becomes a program in 
such that: max CS(; ), subject to: IS(;)  0. Since (PC) is binding,
FC
inf is such that IS(FC
inf;) = 0. When IS(FB;)  0, the optimal contract
is (FC
inf;0).
Consider then that (FCsup) is binding, then (FCinf) is not binding, since tmax
is strictly positive. The program of the AA becomes a program in  such that:
max CS(; ) + tmax, subject to (PC) : IS(;)   tmax  0. The (PC) can be
either binding or not.
 If (PC) is binding, then FC
sup is such that IS(FC
sup;) = tmax. When
IS(FB;)  tmax and IS(;) < tmax, the optimal contract is (FC
sup;tmax).
 If (PC) is not binding, the program becomes a consumer surplus maximization
program with a divestiture solution  such that IS(;)  tmax. When
IS(FB;) > tmax and IS(;)  tmax, the optimal contract is (;tmax).
30Proof: Proposition 4:
Consider that (FC inf) is not binding.
 If IS(
SB
;) < tmax, then (FC sup) is not binding, and (PC) is binding. As,
none of the ￿scal constraints are binding, the second best solution prevails,
t
SB is under tmax and it is always implementable.
 If IS(
SB
;)  tmax and IS(

;) < tmax, then both (FC sup) and (PC) are





CS(; ) + t

+ (1   )







t = IS(;) = tmax
t = IS(;)   IS(;) + tmax
As (FC sup) and (PC) are binding, 
FC
sup is such that: IS(
FC
sup;) = tmax. The
￿rst order conditions for the e￿cient type are those of the ￿rst best. Thus
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;) > tmax and IS(

;)  tmax, then (FC sup) is binding and (PC)
is not. Both (FC sup) and (IC) can be substituted into the maximization
program. We obtain a reduced program with  as the only choice variables:
maxf;g 

CS(; ) + IS(;)   IS(;)






The ￿rst order conditions for the e￿cient type remains the ￿rst best one. On
the contrary, the FOCs for the ine￿cient type become:
(1   )CS(
FC
1 ;) = IS(
FC
1 ;)
31As  2]0;1[ and IS(;) < 0, then CS(
FC





Furthermore, (PC) is not binding thus: IS(
FC
1 ;) > t = tmax = IS(
FC
sup;).











As t depends on the level of divestiture , the previous results implies that
tFC 2]~ t;tFC










Consider that (FC inf) is binding.
 If IS(
SB
;) < tmax, then (FC sup) is not binding, and (PC) is bind-
ing. We must apply the Lagrangian techniques to the AA’s problem. Let
the Lagrangian takes the following form: L(;;) = CS(;) + (1  











2 ;) + IS(
FC






2 ) = IS(
FC
2 ;)
Now, on that particular equations, when  = , the second best results of the
unconstrained program are solutions. This particular case is not possible since
the second best contract is not compatible with the Lagrangian constraint. So
either  <  or  > . The ￿rst is not possible, since it violates the e￿cient
incentive constraint: 
FC > 

















FC < tmax must hold, if not (FC sup) is binding and the
solution is the one of the second point of Proposition 5.
 If IS(
SB
;)  tmax and IS(

;) < tmax, then (FC sup), (FC inf) and (PC)
are binding. As (FC sup) and (PC) are binding, then 
FC
sup is such that:
32tmax = IS(
FC
sup;). As (FC inf) and (IC) are binding, then 
FC
sup is such




sup;). For the same reason that the second










;) > tmax and IS(
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;)  tmax, then both (FC sup) and (FC inf)
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+ (1   )
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tmax = IS(;)   IS(;)
t = tmax
t = 0
Then, t and t can be substituted into the program of the AA by their respective
value. We obtain a reduced program with divestitures as the only choice
variables subject to tmax = IS(;)   IS(;). Let solve this maximization
program thanks to the Lagrangian method: L(;;) = CS(;) + (1  















tmax = IS(;)   IS(;)
Since IS(;) < 0, then CS(
FC





. Considering this divestiture distortion we have:
 >  and 
FC
3 < 
FB.
33